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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the direction, drivers and implications of change in the IMF and the World 
Bank’s policy vision for developing countries before and after the global crisis. By examining the 
evolution of the Fund’s structural conditionalities and the thematic distribution of Bank commitments, 
it provides evidence for a significant change on the ground: a partial retreat from the post-Washington 
Consensus (PWC) agenda, which marked a turn-of-the-century upgrade of orthodox neoliberalism. 
Conceptualising the PWC as a paradigm expansion that followed severe policy failures, the analysis 
finds that although narrow institutional reforms towards upgrading fiscal and financial regimes remain 
popular, the good governance and broad institutions dimension of the agenda has recorded a notable 
decline since the crisis; meanwhile in social policy the twins increasingly diverge. It is argued that this 
selective disengagement is driven by extant operational imperatives and constraints, which are 
further intensified by changes in lending framework and the ongoing transformations in development 
finance. Rather than constitute a shift in policy paradigm, the partial decline of the PWC reflects an 
adjustment in policy practice towards greater flexibility and discretion in the challenging environment 
facing the twins. These findings have implications for the study of the Fund and Bank; they also 
highlight the evolving parameters of North-South development cooperation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The global economic crisis of 2008-09 led to a dramatic rise in International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank lending to developing countries, restoring the Bretton 
Woods twins’ intense involvement in the global South after a brief hiatus earlier in that same 
decade. Scholarship on the Fund and Bank’s resurgent role in the South remains thin, 
however. It also lacks agreement on the trajectory of the prescriptive focus of these leading 
international financial institutions (IFIs). Some analyses highlight shifts and recalibrations, 
especially at the Fund, that indicate recognisable departures from conventional policy 
proclivities (Ban and Gallagher 2015; Grabel 2011; 2015; Moschella 2015). Others, however, 
suggest that the twins’ development wisdom is characterised by considerable paradigmatic 
continuity (Gabor 2010; Güven 2012a; Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King 2016). 
This article seeks to understand the main direction, drivers and implications of change 
in the IMF and the World Bank’s policy vision for developing countries as manifested in 
their lending operations before and after the global crisis. It launches from the observation 
that, when the crisis struck, both organisations had for some time adopted a specific variant 
of neoliberalism: the post-Washington Consensus (PWC). Representing a turn-of-the-century 
upgrade of orthodox neoliberalism, the PWC adhered to the market-orientation of its 
predecessor, but advocated a more comprehensive agenda that emphasised good governance, 
regulatory reforms, and social sustainability (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001; Öniş and 
Şenses 2005; Rodrik 2006; Stiglitz 1998; 2008). It is therefore not the Washington Consensus 
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of the 1980s, but the social, regulatory neoliberalism of the PWC that should serve as the 
benchmark against which to assess continuity and change in the IFIs’ prescriptive vision. 
Do the twins’ post-crisis programmes reflect the PWC wisdom? Only partially. By 
comparing structural loan conditions in 100 largest Fund arrangements in developing 
countries in 2002-2016 and aggregating thematic data on the Bank’s loan commitments for 
the same period, the article demonstrates the following: (i) the ‘good governance’ and ‘broad 
institutions’ agenda has been wiped out in Fund facilities and suffered a relative decline in 
Bank commitments since the crisis, although reforms that target ‘narrow institutions’, in 
particular to upgrade national fiscal and financial regimes, remain popular; (ii) while the 
social sustainability agenda has been fully consolidated in Bank lending, the Fund is 
increasingly reluctant to directly engage the design of social policies; and (iii) regional 
variations notwithstanding, these patterns hold for both concessional and nonconcessional 
lending. The empirical finding, therefore, is that the PWC agenda is in partial decline on the 
ground. It has been largely abandoned by the IMF in favour of a narrower policy vision, 
whereas the World Bank’s advocacy of some of its distinguishing content has weakened.  
The article explores the causes and implications of this selective disengagement from 
the PWC by drawing on the rich theoretical and empirical scholarship on the IFIs. Its main 
contribution is to put operational imperatives at the centre of analysis. Such imperatives 
appear in both rationalist and constructivist research on international organisations (IOs), yet 
they seldom take centre stage. In the case of the Fund and Bank, they include various direct 
influences on lending practice, ranging from lending framework and staff expertise to 
evolving borrower preferences. I argue that, given the breadth and complexity of the PWC as 
well as ongoing transformations in international development finance, these practical internal 
and external constraints provide profound insight into contemporary IFI practice.  
This argument is developed in three stages. First, the analysis offers a novel 
conceptualisation of the PWC as a paradigm expansion (as opposed to paradigm shift). The 
twins expanded their prescriptive gaze to counteract the erosion of their expert authority 
under severe policy failures associated with the original consensus (Best 2014). The way new 
norms were incorporated without abandoning existing repertoire matched what historical 
institutionalist scholars call layering (Streeck and Thelen 2005); the exploration–exploitation 
duality advanced in organisation theory (March 1991) also helps capture this distinct 
combination of old and new. Yet this broadened policy content quickly encountered severe 
constraints, exposing gaps in expertise and receiving initially reluctant staff uptake (Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004, ch3; Weaver 2008). Its excessively wide, top-down character also 
contravened synchronous internal initiatives and external dynamics. As a result some PWC 
norms remained weakly ‘internalised’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and only partially 
‘stabilised’ (Park and Vetterlein 2010).  
Second, building on official documents, secondary literature, and interviews with 
Fund and Bank staff, the article explains the selective retreat from the PWC with the 
intensification of these operational constraints. Internally, the twins’ already contested 
capacity to promote PWC-style reforms has been frustrated further by the post-crisis overhaul 
of their lending architecture. Externally, changes in the ‘organizational fields’ (Moschella and 
Vetterlein 2014) or ‘policy areas’ (Lipscy 2015) in which the IFIs operate are significant. Of 
particular relevance are structural shifts in the international development regime (Babb and 
Chorev 2016; Mawdsley 2017), which stifles borrower demand and tolerance for intrusive 
governance and social policy reforms. The operational spaces vacated are often filled with 
programmes that reflect the Fund and Bank’s core competences (Broome 2015; Güven 
2017a). What is missing from this explanation also matters to students of the twins: the 
partial decline of the PWC is neither directly correlated with the preferences of powerful 
members, nor does it stem from unambiguous shifts in the normative proclivities of staff. 
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Third, the article contends that the selective disengagement from the PWC represents 
a shift not in policy paradigm, but in policy practice towards enhanced flexibility and 
discretion. A key dynamic is that the PWC components in decline are not fully abandoned: 
not only do they receive ample organisational and staff recognition, but they continue to be 
routinely implemented in willing clients. As such, the twins’ current lending patterns do not 
reveal a severe systemic discrepancy between rhetoric and policy along the lines of 
‘organised hypocrisy’ (Weaver 2008). Rather, they reflect a form of ‘bureaucratic ambiguity’ 
(Best 2012a) that reinforces discretionary practice to counteract environmental uncertainty 
and diversity. In an evolving context of international development finance which expands 
borrowers’ options while constraining Northern multilaterals’ capacity to ‘coercively diffuse’ 
grand policy paradigms, the selective retreat from the PWC usefully augments the twins’ 
operational flexibility — albeit at the expense of paradigmatic certitude. 
 
 
A PARADIGM EXPANSION 
 
While the term ‘post-Washington Consensus’ implies a definite break with the 
Washington Consensus, the policy norms that comprise the PWC represented not a paradigm 
shift but a paradigm expansion within mainstream wisdom. The origins of this expansion lay 
in the Fund and Bank’s acknowledgement of the failures of the neoliberal orthodoxy that had 
informed their prescriptions since the late 1970s. The PWC addressed this discontent by 
complementing, rather than replacing, market-orientation with a focus on the social 
dimension and the political-institutional context of development. 
The main driver behind the PWC was the understanding within and outside the IFIs 
that orthodox neoliberalism had failed to deliver its promise and become impractical to 
pursue without adjustment (Gore 2000). As such the PWC was a response to what Jacqueline 
Best terms contested failures that ‘raised significant questions about the [IFIs’] claims to 
expert authority’ (2014: 67). Two failures in particular resonated with the economism of the 
IFIs: First, the growth record of liberalisation was disappointing. Neoclassical economists 
had argued that market reforms would stimulate growth. This proved wrong as median real 
per capita growth in the South in 1980-98 was a dismal 0.0 percent (Easterly 2001). Second, 
the quality of economic performance was problematic. While extreme poverty fell, the 
number of the poor rose. Meanwhile the North-South gap widened and domestic inequality 
often increased (Wade 2004). Financial volatility was also problematic. Premature capital 
account liberalisation exposed weak domestic financial systems to the vagaries of global 
markets. In 1994 Mexico and Turkey, both loyal clients of the IFIs, became the first 
casualties in a subsequent string of crises to devastate large middle-income countries (MICs).   
By the mid-1990s observers had begun to argue that adherence to a set of neoliberal 
policies was insufficient; the scope had to be broadened towards ‘second generation reforms’ 
(Naím 1994). Elements of expansion were already visible at the Bank. James Wolfensohn’s 
famous ‘cancer of corruption’ speech urged the organisation to consider not only ‘economic 
and financial efficiency’ but also ‘transparency, accountability, and institutional capacity’ 
(Wolfensohn 1996). The following year’s World Development Report underlined this shift in 
focus. The Bank now announced that ‘development requires an effective state, one that plays 
a catalytic, facilitating role’ (World Bank 1997: iii). Extreme state minimalism was no more.   
The tipping point was the Asian Crisis, during which the IMF’s standard prescriptions 
received severe criticism. A flurry of internal research and official reports in subsequent years 
facilitated the switch to an expanded prescriptive outlook. Two World Bank texts in 1998 set 
the tone. The first was Joseph Stiglitz’s (1998) famous WIDER lecture, which coined the 
term PWC — the paper was aptly entitled ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals.’ The 
second was Shahid Burki and Guillermo Perry’s (1998) instrumental report on the need for a 
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stupendous range of institutional reforms. Next year came the first of the Bank’s ‘Governance 
Matters’ papers, which formulated aggregate governance indicators ahead of its ‘Governance 
and Anti-Corruption’ (GAC) agenda (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido- Labatón 1999). 
While the bulk of the intellectual work towards the PWC took place at the Bank, the 
Fund acted first to revise its lending framework in accordance, by ditching in 1999 the much 
maligned concessional scheme for low-income countries (LICs), the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF). It was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF), signalling a concern for social sustainability ahead of the 2000 UN Millennium 
Summit. The Bank moved much later in 2004 when its Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) 
were repackaged as Development Policy Loans (DPLs) as the main ‘policy lending’ vehicle, 
by which time the distinguishing content of the PWC was already consolidated. 
What precisely was this distinguishing content? Just as the Washington Consensus, 
the PWC too urged countries to liberalise and open their markets while exercising fiscal and 
monetary restraint. That neoliberal–globalist core was never disputed (Babb 2013). However, 
late developers were now also advised to pursue stable and inclusive growth, with poverty 
reduction as a core objective. Just as important, such high-quality growth required an array of 
market-enhancing institutions, from good governance at the broadest level to specific sectoral 
arrangements: neoliberal policy adjustments had to be accompanied by comprehensive 
institutional reforms. The result was an ambitious expansion of the twins’ prescriptive gaze, 
culminating in what was later more accurately labelled an ‘Augmented Washington 
Consensus’ (Rodrik 2006) or the ‘Washington Consensus Plus Plus’ (Stiglitz 2008: 50). 
One way to conceptualise this peculiar combination of the old and new is to invoke 
the historical institutionalist notion of layering (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 22ff). Emphasising 
the introduction of new elements alongside existing ones, layering accurately depicts a 
common mode of incremental change in the IFIs (Chwieroth 2014; Moschella and Vetterlein 
2014). The PWC mirrored this pattern closely: its focus on the socio-political context of 
development complemented rather than supplanted the original consensus. Organisation 
theory offers a congruous conceptual device. Given how it proceeded from a sense of failure 
that required adjustment in IFI practice, the PWC can be viewed in terms of organisational 
adaptation, which is often associated with the dual processes of exploration and exploitation. 
Exploitation is characterised by ‘the refinement and extension of existing competences’, 
whereas exploration includes ‘experimentation with new alternatives’ (March 1991: 85).   
Crucially, not all distinctive elements of the PWC were brand new; some entailed ‘the 
exploitation of old certainties’ (ibid: 71), displaying continuity with existing repertoire. Put 
differently, some characteristic PWC norms were already relatively ‘stabilised’ (Park and 
Vetterlein 2010); their inclusion in the broadened agenda ensured further ‘internalisation’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), often via reframing. Consider the social dimension of the 
PWC, the internalisation of which was a largely natural evolution of the Bank’s repertoire, 
which had already contained the 1970s’ wave of human development concerns along with an 
emergent focus on empowerment, gender, and social inclusion (Rojas 2015). Given this 
legacy, the Bank was able to signal its commitment to social sustainability by increasing its 
routine lending towards pertinent projects. At the operational level this marked a change 
mainly in degree, implying ‘first order change’ in Hall’s (1993) well-known classification. 
Part of the focus on institutions also involved exploitation of existing competence. 
Both organisations were accustomed to prescribing reforms in arrangements that governed 
specific sectors and policy domains, including financial sector regulations, central banking, 
tax administration, and public expenditure management. In a global context haunted by 
frequent fisco-financial crises, the twins were keen to make loans towards reforms in these 
areas, some of which paralleled evolving international norms (as in banking regulations). 
This interest in what the IMF (2005) termed ‘narrow institutions’ also fit a global policy 
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environment in which the centrality of market regulation was rediscovered (Levi-Faur 2005). 
In these domains, the PWC helped sharpen and entrench a pre-existing reformist focus.  
No wonder then many early critics of the PWC rejected the notion that it represented 
a genuine departure from its predecessor (Fine et al. 2001; cf. Öniş and Şenses 2005). Its 
characteristic content also encountered stringent attacks. The poverty reduction focus was 
frequently portrayed as a disciplinary rather than emancipatory intervention, promoting a 
more intense neoliberalism (Cammack 2004), with severe political consequences (Gould 
2005). Meanwhile the institutional reform agenda was considered too ambitious for the IFIs 
to prescribe given their own structural constraints (Pauly 1999; Woods 2000), and too 
arduous to implement for most borrowers given capacity and collective action deficits 
afflicting the South (Grindle 2004). Of particular concern was that many reform projects 
dismissed questions of endogeneity and compatibility (Przeworski 2004; Harrison 2004), 
advocating instead the transplantation of Anglo-American blueprints (Evans 2004). 
 
 
THE POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AS POLICY PRACTICE: 
AN ‘OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES’ APPROACH 
 
The central argument of this article is that the ailing fortunes of the PWC can be best 
explained with the intensification of the extant operational constraints it encountered. While 
early evaluations of the PWC also hinted at problems of viability, I advance a more 
methodical focus on the role of operational imperatives in shaping IFI practice. ‘Operation’ 
here refers narrowly to the twins’ lending operations (excluding other activities such as 
surveillance or technical assistance). Operational imperatives can thus be conceived as 
phenomena that directly impact lending practice at either side of the lender-borrower nexus. 
Internally, the lending architecture, bureaucratic culture, the nuts and bolts of programme 
design, and resources pertaining to both expertise and financial bottom line pose formative 
constraints. Externally, borrower demand and preferences as well as sea changes in the wider 
lending environment constitute core dynamics. Obviously these variegated phenomena do not 
exist in a vacuum; they are conditioned by other forces. A formal explanatory model might 
incorporate some as intervening rather than independent variables. Yet given the breadth and 
complexity of the PWC, and the historical context of its rise and partial demise, I contend that 
a sustained focus on these imperatives offers a rewarding vantage point. 
This is a meaningful analytic reorientation given both real-world changes and the 
overly ambitious character of the PWC agenda. Conventional theoretical models of IFI 
behaviour have been empirically informed by an era when the twins were able to exert 
significant control over lending practice — either as agents of Northern shareholders as 
typically portrayed in rationalist accounts, or as organisations autonomously asserting their 
normative preferences as most constructivist research saw them. By contrast, the PWC 
followed from the demise of the ‘confident and direct style of governance’ (Best 2014: 62) 
that had characterised the era of structural adjustment. As we shall see later, it suffered from a 
central paradox of advocating a complex and onerous agenda at a time when conventional 
Fund and Bank practice was challenged by transformations in the global economy and in 
particular development finance. Unsurprisingly, then, as policy advice to be disbursed via 
conditional lending, the PWC faced severe internal and external operational constraints.  
The main theoretical contribution of this approach is to present a viable way of 
straddling the rationalist–constructivist divide in IO scholarship by highlighting phenomena 
that routinely feature in both strands of research, but seldom take centre stage in either. 
Rationalist and power-based accounts of IFI behaviour typically emphasise the interests of 
Northern shareholders (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Stone 2004). However, preferences and 
capabilities of borrowers also draw occasional attention. Lyne, Nielson and Tierney (2009) 
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analyse the preferences of all members to trace trends in lending by multilateral development 
banks; Pop-Eleches (2009) shows IMF lending favours systemically important borrowers; 
Lipscy (2015) suggests attractive ‘outside options’ empower members to foster institutional 
changes at the Fund and Bank. And while the hallmark of constructivist accounts is the role 
of ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), in exploring IFI autonomy scholars engage a much 
wider range of internal dynamics, including standard operating procedures, bureaucratic 
politics and culture, and staff profiles (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Broad 2006; Chwieroth 
2008; Weaver 2007). Finally, some constructivist research also examines the impact of 
borrower preferences and the external operational environment. Park (2010) illustrates how 
borrower influence on the part of MICs undermined the stabilisation of the Bank’s safeguards 
policy norm, whereas Moschella and Vetterlein (2014) argue via a case study of the Fund that 
an IO’s position in an ‘organisational field’ is central to patterns of policy change. Yet despite 
this broad recognition, operational constraints upon lending are rarely problematised as 
central drivers of IFI practice (for an exception, see Sharma 2013).  
The PWC is a good case to illustrate the promise of this approach, for it was afflicted 
with unfavourable imperatives from the outset. Internally, most constraints stemmed from 
PWC elements that required exploration and nurturing of new competence. We have seen, for 
example, that the Bank was able to recycle its extant repertoire to internalise the social 
dimension of the PWC. In sharp contrast, the Fund lacked any tangible background in this 
area, and faced a genuine problem of layering new onto old practice. To that end it had to 
devise a novel instrument (the PRGF), bringing its adjustment closer to Hall’s (1993) ‘second 
order change.’ Furthermore, because its structural conditionalities were qualitative in nature, 
it was forced to prescribe detailed policy and institutional designs in realms entirely outside 
its staff expertise. Put differently, its lending framework augmented the significance of the 
types of expert authority it lacked in the first place, rendering ‘social policy’ a particularly 
tough operational domain for the organisation (Vetterlein 2010).  
The institutional reform agenda posed a similar challenge, for both organisations. The 
belief in the curative promise of institutional upgrading did not stop at narrow arrangements; 
the doctrinal justification for the agenda demanded that the IFIs turn their gaze to ‘broad 
institutions’ as well. The Bank in particular relied on the growing interest in institutions in 
development economics, inspired by the new institutional economics of Douglass North and 
reflected in high-profile papers (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). Unlike the 
narrow agenda, this ‘institutional turn’ focused on macro arrangements — the quality of 
governance, property rights, control of corruption, and so on. In essence it saw a high-quality 
democracy wielding an effective state as the most fertile political-institutional shell for 
development. Consequently the two layers of the institutional reform agenda produced 
different operational imperatives: whereas ‘narrow’ reforms encouraged exploitation of 
existing practice, the preoccupation with ‘broad institutions’ entailed exploration and 
experimentation with new practice. 
These exploratory requisites could not be easily reconciled with the twins’ existing 
culture and expertise. Expanding their prescriptive outlook to restore their expert authority 
paradoxically exacerbated the problem, generating new internal tensions as documented in 
the constructivist literature. ‘Each layer of new goals’, Barnett and Finnemore write, was 
‘increasingly distant from the Fund’s core competencies’, weakening its credibility and 
raising ‘the possibility of poor policy’ (2004: 66, emphasis added). The Bank faced a similar 
bind as operations moved into unfamiliar terrain that contravened its project-based, 
disbursement-oriented culture, causing among staff ‘continued reluctance to tackle 
governance and institutional development projects’ (Weaver 2008: 118). As a result, internal 
commitment to the exploratory components of the PWC remained thin. To complicate 
matters further, key ‘norm entrepreneurs’ such as Joseph Stiglitz and Ravi Kanbur lost their 
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standing in battles against conventional policy concerns (Wade 2002). In stark contrast with 
the Washington Consensus, the PWC at first claimed only limited support from within.  
Externally, the radical expansion of the policy scope ignored the sea changes in 
international development, contravening attendant shifts in borrower preferences. The 
augmented PWC agenda only reinforced ‘[t]he location of expertise in a geography of power 
emanating from the global north in general, and US-based institutions in particular’ 
(Sheppard and Leitner 2010: 188-9). Entrenching this hierarchy contradicted the changing 
parameters of ‘international development’ towards new emphases on partnerships and 
cooperation, as manifested in the successive ‘aid effectiveness’ summits after 2002 and in 
internal initiatives such as the ‘country ownership’ framework (Best 2007).  
Global economic dynamics were more crucial. Continuing financial crises in the late 
1990s had indicated a fortuitous context to ‘diffuse’ the twins’ broadened agenda via 
conditional lending. However, the 2001 Argentine and Turkish meltdowns proved to be the 
final major jolts to the system for a while, after which the international economy recorded 
seven fat years of high growth fuelled by record increases in trade and financial flows. As the 
need for official loans subsided, the IFIs’ expanded prescriptive outlook appeared 
increasingly out of place. Borrower preferences shifted accordingly. The absence of financial 
emergencies, combined with heightened sensibilities of sovereignty accompanying growing 
perceptions of a rebalancing of global power towards the East and South, left little appetite 
for intrusive IFI programmes especially amongst large MICs. The Fund was hit hardest, with 
the decline in its business volume triggering a mass staff layoff in 2007. The Bank did better, 
rolling out numerous large DPLs inspired by the PWC wisdom, especially in Southeast Asia 
(Carroll 2010). Yet it too faced uncertainty over borrower demand, with its loan portfolio 
significantly shrunk since the Asian Crisis. 
Consequently, the PWC faced very different operational conditions than its 
predecessor, which hindered the stabilisation of its composite policy content as a whole. Park 
and Vetterlein’s (2010: 6–7) three-pronged conception of norm strength — formal validity, 
social recognition, cultural validity — provides useful differential perspective here. Based on 
these criteria, by the mid-2000s only the ‘narrow institutions’ agenda enjoyed sufficient 
‘strength’ at both the lender and the borrower ends of the operational environment. The social 
sustainability agenda was mostly stabilised at the Bank, but did not feature comparable 
recognition and cultural validity at the Fund (Vetterlein 2010). Meanwhile the signature 
‘broad institutions’ agenda was most disadvantaged: it retained strong formal validity, but 
received only tenuous social recognition internally at both organisations while  enjoying often 
limited cultural validity across borrowers. This variable strength of the different components 
of the PWC would also be reflected in the Fund and Bank’s post-crisis lending. 
 
 
A CONSENSUS NO MORE: THE IMF BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS 
 
 The crisis resulted in a dramatic rise in the role of the IMF in the global economy. The 
Fund’s increased presence stemmed in part from its surveillance, research, and policy 
coordination functions. Yet most of the IMF’s expanded role was rooted in the phenomenal 
rise in its loan commitments. Before the crisis, the Fund was on the verge of financial 
obscurity: its total commitments in FY2007-2008 amounted to less than SDR 2 billion.1
This figure is misleading in two respects. First, more than half these commitments 
reflected Flexible Credit Line (FCL) arrangements — a facility introduced in 2009, with only 
three ‘permanent’ clients thus far (Colombia, Mexico and Poland). Essentially an insurance 
scheme aimed at projecting confidence, the FCL works on the principle that signees need not 
draw: no amount has ever been disbursed under FCL. Second, loan allocation has been highly 
 By 
comparison, in FY2009-2016 commitments exceeded SDR 500 billion (IMF 2016a: 65-72). 
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uneven. More than half of actual loans went to European members — Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Romania. Outside Europe, too, there is an oligopoly of 
borrowers, with Iraq, Pakistan and in particular Ukraine accounting for most of the 
commitments. Thus, although the Fund has signed more than 100 arrangements in the South 
since the crisis, its conventional clients constitute a small share of its loan portfolio. 
 These unusual lending patterns, along with the organisation’s evolving policy advice, 
have set the tone of current research on the Fund. Its unprecedented engagements in Europe 
have made a popular topic (Hodson 2015; Lütz and Kranke 2014). Yet two issues have 
received particular attention. The first is fiscal policy — in particular, debates over austerity 
versus stimulus (Ban 2015; Broome 2015). The second concerns financial regulations and the 
organisation’s uncharacteristically receptive attitude towards capital controls (Chwieroth 
2014; Grabel 2015; Moschella 2015). By contrast, a few early studies aside (e.g. Clegg 
2012), little has been written on the Fund’s resurgent role in its traditional client base. 
 Here I seek to fill this gap by comparing the Fund’s structural conditionalities in its 
non-European loans before and after the crisis. To that end, I use the IMF’s MONA 
(Monitoring of Fund Arrangements) database, which lists all programme conditionality, 
quantitative and structural.2
 MONA uses 71 codes to classify loan conditions, with each code assigned to a 
distinct economic descriptor. I have identified 33 of these codes/descriptors as characteristic 
of the PWC agenda, which I then divided into four groups: fiscal and monetary restructuring; 
financial policy and reform; public and corporate governance; and social policy (Appendix 
A). In each group, only descriptors that are readily associated with the PWC are selected: 
reforms in revenue and expenditure regimes; central bank reforms; financial regulations; 
various governance themes including civil service, transparency, and anti-corruption; and 
various social policy concerns ranging from pension reform to welfare regime and labour 
markets. I include all three types of structural conditionality: prior actions (PA), which 
borrowers must meet before programme approval; structural performance criteria (SPC), 
which borrowers must meet before the disbursement of a tranche of funds; and structural 
benchmarks (SB), which indicate compliance with programme objectives. Note that SPC was 
discontinued in 2009; disbursements are now decided at programme reviews.  
 I look at the most common instruments: Standby Arrangements 
(SBAs) and Extended Fund Facilities (EFFs), which offer non-concessional loans to MICs; 
and PRGFs (and their successor, Extended Credit Facilities or ECFs), which offer 
concessional loans to LICs. For a before/after analysis, I examine 25 largest programmes in 
each category for FY2002-2008 and FY2009-2016, for a total of 100 facilities. 
One qualification: I include only conditionalities that appear at the stage of ‘Board 
approval’, identified in MONA as R0. While including all conditions at every programme 
review (R1, R2, and so on) would paint a fuller picture, concentrating on conditions at the 
approval stage helps avoid duplication and, more importantly, offers a good snapshot of what 
the IMF identifies as the core problems as it sets foot in a country. Focusing on this early 
stage gives us the Fund’s original diagnosis and remedial preferences. 
The results reveal three major findings (Figures 1 through 4).1
                                                 
1 Note to editors/reviewers: See the review-only file for the data set relating to Figures 1 through 10.  
 First, there is sustained 
emphasis on fiscal, monetary and financial measures. This is consistent with Broome’s 
(2015) suggestion of a ‘back to basics’ approach whereby the Fund narrows the scope of its 
advice towards its core competences. Looking at subcategories, during both periods monetary 
policy-related measures (often about central bank independence) constituted about one-fifth 
of all ‘fiscal and monetary restructuring’ conditions, although it is noteworthy that fiscal 
measures have carried a greater weight in post-crisis concessional loans. Likewise, the Fund 
pays greater attention to financial sector reforms in PRGFs/ECFs, a trend contrasted in SBAs. 
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Figure 1 Structural Conditionalities in Top-25 SBAs/EFFs and PRGFs/ECFs 
Fiscal and Monetary Restructuring [2002-2008 vs 2009-2016; n=100] 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2 Structural Conditionalities in Top-25 SBAs/EFFs and PRGFs/ECFs 
Financial Policy and Reform [2002-2008 vs 2009-2016; n=100] 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3 Structural Conditionalities in Top-25 SBAs/EFFs and PRGFs/ECFs 
Public and Corporate Governance [2002-2008 vs 2009-2016; n=100] 
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Figure 4 Structural Conditionalities in Top-25 SBAs/EFFs and PRGFs/ECFs 
Social Policy [2002-2008 vs 2009-2016; n=100] 
 
  
 
 
Whether this data could be interpreted as the Fund deliberately tightening policy reins 
in LICs makes an interesting question for future research. Given MICs often have better 
systems in place, the organisation may have identified a more pressing need for such reforms 
in poorer countries. Indeed some MICs already implemented extensive reforms in these 
areas: in the Dominican Republic and Ukraine pre-crisis arrangements carried noticeably 
more fiscal and financial conditions than post-crisis ones. Put differently, ‘domestic lock-in 
of structural reforms’ (Broome 2015: 18) may be stronger in nonconcessional clients.      
 The second and most striking finding is the collapse of the ‘public and corporate 
governance’ conditionalities. This category covers eight descriptors that overlap with the 
Bank’s GAC agenda, and was once nearly as visible as financial sector reforms. It is 
important to note that this finding should not be read as wholesale denunciation of the 
institutional reform agenda. The Fund is not reform-shy at all in ‘narrow institutions’, 
especially with regards fisco-financial norms. For example, fiscal transparency, a regular 
fixture of the Fund’s repertoire, has recently received considerably more attention. 
Rather, the Fund is retreating from its promise of improving broad institutions. 
Amongst these, by far the most dramatic decline is in the sensitive area of anti-corruption. In 
the mid-2000s anti-corruption reforms were remarkably popular. From Colombia and 
Romania to numerous African borrowers including Cameroon, DR Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Uganda, countries underwent an almost identical trajectory of IMF-led reform. 
The cycle typically began with the prescription of national anti-corruption surveys, to be 
followed by the crafting of an anti-corruption strategy and passage of relevant legislation, 
often culminating in the establishment of an anti-corruption authority. Yet corruption-related 
conditionality is now very rare, with Ukraine’s 2014 and 2015 programmes as the only major 
exceptions. This finding is consistent with the Fund’s own acknowledgement of a decline in 
reference to corruption in its country documents (IMF 2017: 63).  
 Third, there is also a decline in social policy-related conditions, although not of 
comparable magnitude. A more important finding is that the Fund’s uptake of the PWC’s 
social agenda had already been weak, especially in concessional loans. In fact, more than half 
the programmes in our pre-crisis sample had no structural conditions attached regarding 
social policy. Even in large SBAs, as in Argentina in 2003 and Brazil in 2002, the IMF was 
not keen to interfere directly with the objectives and design of pensions, health care and 
labour markets. It has grown even more reluctant to do so since the crisis.  
 This finding sheds important light on Fund practice in this domain. Although the 
organisation has recently tightened its commitment to social policy by adopting social 
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spending targets in its concessional loans (Clegg 2014), adherence to these targets has proved 
problematic as observed by Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King (2016: 20-22). Their explanation 
for this discrepancy is the Fund’s escalated recourse to ‘organised hypocrisy.’ While this is a 
widely accepted dynamic for IFIs, our data supports the alternative insight that, even during 
the heyday of the PWC, policy norms pertaining to social development were not ‘fully 
internalized by IMF staff’ (Vetterlein 2010: 112). In contrast with the organisation’s once 
earnest commitment to reforming broad institutions in its clients, its interest in the social 
component of the PWC had never amounted to a genuinely transformative ambition to appear 
with matching frequency in its structural conditionalities. This interest is now much weaker.  
 
 
A DIMINISHED CONSENSUS: 
THE WORLD BANK BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS 
 
 Like its Bretton Woods twin, the Bank too enjoyed a sharp increase in commitments 
after the crisis, from about $20 billion per year in the mid-2000s to a high of $60 billion in 
2010, only to settle in the $40-45 billion range in recent years (World Bank 2016: 62-63) — a 
healthy figure indicating sustained financial presence in the South. In contrast with the Fund, 
however, its post-crisis operations received little scholarly attention. The few pieces that have 
appeared suggest minimal, if any, change in the organisation’s policy vision (Güven 2012a; 
Hall 2015). The Bank’s independent evaluation unit concurs, stating that ‘much of the new 
lending in response to the crisis reflected pre-crisis patterns’ (IEG 2012: xii).   
 What is an effective way to assess the evolution of the policy content of Bank 
lending? Here I use the Bank’s own thematic classification of its operations, which comprises 
eleven ‘major themes’ and, under these, 82 ‘themes’. For each approved project, up to five 
themes are assigned a percentage share to identify their financial weight in the loan. One 
problem with this classification is that thematic shares are often calculated at the Washington 
headquarters and do not necessarily reflect the understanding of staff at country offices who 
lead project design. As such, theme data should not be taken as a precise metric to analyse 
individual loans.3 However, given the massive sample size,4
 Using data from Annual Reports (FY2002-2016), the analysis begins by comparing 
trends in the share of commitments to five major themes in two groups to trace the extent to 
which the PWC agenda is consolidated in Bank programmes. The major themes selected are 
emblematic of the PWC: ‘Public sector governance’ and ‘rule of law’ major themes contain 
numerous items that fit the PWC’s good governance and institutions dimension. I group them 
as governance. The social policy dimension of the PWC, meanwhile, is amply represented in 
‘human development’, ‘social development, gender and inclusion’, and ‘social protection and 
risk management’ major themes. They are grouped under social sustainability.  
 this thematic categorisation 
provides a useful comparative basis to evaluate the broad direction of Bank support for a 
stupendous range of development objectives. It is therefore a highly meaningful aggregate 
measure. Endorsing the relevance of this methodology, the Bank’s Annual Reports include 
comparative shares of each major theme in its IBRD-IDA lending as well as a thematic 
breakdown of commitments in its six main geographical regions.  
The findings indicate a clear pattern (Figures 5 and 6). The share of commitments to 
social sustainability themes has been steady since the early 2000s; as such, the social 
dimension of the PWC has been consolidated in Bank operations. By contrast, the 
governance reform agenda have fallen out of favour in relative terms (if not nominally, given 
the exponential postcrisis increase in Bank commitments). If the damage in this category does 
not appear as severe as it is in Fund lending, one might hypothesise that it is because the 
Bank’s ‘public sector governance’ major theme also contains several distinctive narrow 
institutions items such as ‘public expenditure’ and ‘tax policy’ (more on this later). 
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Figure 5 Governance and Social Sustainability Themes in IBRD-IDA Lending  
 (2002-2016) (Percentage share of total commitments) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Governance and Social Sustainability Themes in IBRD-IDA Lending  
 (2002-2008 vs 2009-2016) (Percentage share of total commitments) 
 
  
 
 
 In exploring Fund lending we distinguished between concessional (PRGF/ECF) and 
non-concessional (SBA/EFF) arrangements. This distinction is potentially more significant 
for the Bank given its client profile. Over the past decade most large MICs have explicitly 
avoided Fund facilities. By contrast large MICs continue to borrow heavily from the Bank, 
and remain crucial for its bottom line (Güven 2017a: 498). Could this constraint affect 
lending patterns? In particular, given governance reforms tend to be politically intrusive, 
should not the decline in this category be more pronounced in the sovereignty-conscious 
MICs less reliant on official loans? While no thematic data are provided in Annual Reports 
for IBRD versus IDA commitments, regional breakdowns furnish a fair approximation. 
Below, I compare governance and social sustainability themes in four regions: ‘Africa’ and 
‘South Asia,’ where IDA lending is dominant, and ‘Latin America and Caribbean’ and ‘East 
Asia,’ where most loans are made by the IBRD on a non-concessional basis. 
Figures 7 and 8 summarise the results, with puzzling regional variations. Although the 
relative weight of commitments to governance themes declined in all four regions, the slump 
was more pronounced in IDA-heavy Africa and South Asia than the IBRD-heavy Latin 
America and East Asia. This is counterintuitive as IDA countries tend to feature poorer 
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governance and lower institutional quality, which one might expect to either facilitate 
member demand for governance reforms or else provoke the Bank to promote such reforms 
with more determination. Meanwhile social sustainability themes appear healthy everywhere, 
with a considerable climb in Latin America, owing arguably to regional attitudes. Elsewhere 
the themes that comprise this category account for 25-30 percent of commitments. And 
although the slight decline in the share of such concerns in Africa and South Asia seems 
curious, there was indeed a significant nominal increase in commitments to social themes in 
both regions given the sharp increase in the volume of Bank lending during this period.       
 
 
Figure 7 Governance Themes in IBRD-IDA Lending in Selected Regions  
 (2002-2008 vs 2009-2016) (Percentage share of total commitments) 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8 Social Sustainability Themes in IBRD-IDA Lending in Selected Regions 
 (2002-2008 vs 2009-2016) (Percentage share of total commitments) 
 
  
 
  
A crucial question given our findings on the IMF is whether the decline in 
commitments to governance themes in World Bank operations too applies differently to 
‘narrow’ versus ‘broad’ institutions. Fortunately the Bank’s project database includes data on 
individual themes that comprise major themes, which in turn allows us to distinguish between 
the two categories. Themes that reflect narrow institutions are sprinkled across several major 
themes, and include items that range from tax policy to municipal governance and rural 
institutions. Meanwhile broad institutions are represented in themes such as administrative 
reform, anti-corruption, property rights, and legal institutions. By examining how frequently 
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these narrow and broad institutional categories feature in commitments in different regions 
before and after the crisis, we can perform a prevalence analysis in relation to Bank lending 
— in the same vein as our analysis of Fund lending based on MONA data. Themes selected 
for this exercise are listed in Appendix B.  
 
 
Figure 9 ‘Narrow Institutions’ Themes per Project in IBRD-IDA Lending  
 in Selected Regions (2002-2008 vs 2009-2016) 
 
  
 
 
Figure 10 ‘Broad Institutions’ Themes per Project in IBRD-IDA Lending  
 in Selected Regions (2002-2008 vs 2009-2016) 
 
  
 
 
 Three points can be made in light of this data (Figures 9 and 10).5 First, consistent 
with trends in Fund lending, in Bank projects as well, it is the broad institutions category that 
has lost its appeal. The decline was most prominent in East Asia, where only 15 percent of 
post-crisis programmes have had any such content compared to more than half before the 
crisis. As such, there is no escaping the conclusion that the good governance agenda is in 
structural decline. Second, while there is also a decline in the frequency with which ‘narrow 
institutions’ appear in Bank projects, this focus on distinct policy and institutional domains 
remains alive, especially in environmental policies, municipal governance, public expenditure 
regimes, and rural institutions. Third, there are interesting regional contrasts in the relative 
weight versus the frequency of governance loans. Note in particular that while the relative 
weight of commitments to governance themes has declined far more sharply in Africa than in 
East Asia (Figure 7), the decline in the frequency of ‘broad institutions’ themes is more 
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dramatic in the latter (Figure 10). Put differently, broad institutional reforms remain relatively 
popular in Africa; however, they do not receive as much funding, and claim smaller chunks 
of numerous projects. By contrast, such reforms claim bigger chunks of fewer projects in East 
Asia, indicating a specialised, possibly country-specific, focus. This would be consistent with 
the Bank’s business model that requires a more client-oriented approach than the Fund, 
especially in regions heavily populated by MICs. 
 
 
FROM OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS TO DISCRETIONARY PRACTICE:  
TOWARDS A NEW REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
Since the global crisis, the IMF has de-emphasised the distinctive content of the PWC 
agenda with the exception of narrow institutional reforms in domains that reflect its core 
competences, that is, fiscal and financial restructuring. Not only does it no longer aspire to 
improve broad institutions across its Southern borrowers via policy conditionality, but its 
already reluctant involvement in the design of social policies has further attenuated. By 
contrast, the social dimension of the PWC remains entrenched at the World Bank, which 
consistently allocates more than a quarter of its total commitments to human development, 
social inclusion, and basic protection projects. Yet in Bank lending, too, the focus on broad 
institutions has subsided. The good governance agenda is facing a generalised decline. 
How are we to explain and understand these patterns? Previous sections have 
demonstrated that the PWC norms in decline today had already encountered severe internal 
and external constraints and were thus only partially stabilised. Drawing on secondary 
literature, official documents, and interviews with Fund and Bank staff, this section argues 
that operational imperatives over the past decade have evolved to intensify these extant 
constraints, to the point where the already weakly internalised elements of the PWC could no 
longer continue as inbuilt components of lending practice. Far from signalling a new 
paradigm shift, however, this selective disengagement from the PWC illustrates the Fund and 
Bank’s quest for operational flexibility in a structurally transformed lending environment.  
Before explicating this argument, let us briefly consider two alternative explanations. 
Often following principal-agent models, the rationalist scholarship on the IFIs draws attention 
to shareholder preferences, especially of the largest Northern shareholders such as the US 
(Stone 2004; Hawkins et al. 2006). Yet such preferences do not appear to be directly 
significant in this case. The rise of the PWC was at best loosely aligned with the interests of 
powerful members. Meanwhile recent voice reforms yielded minimal change in 
representation across membership (Vestergaard and Wade 2015). Any overlap between the 
lending patterns unveiled here and shareholder preferences would be indirect or coincidental, 
e.g. mediated through changes in lending instruments or targets (Clegg 2014).  
Likewise, the ailing fortunes of the PWC cannot be explained with an unambiguous 
ideational shift within. Persistent management and staff recognition of the good governance 
agenda is case in point. As an IMF mission head who led a governance-heavy programme in 
the mid-2000s insists, Fund staff never doubt ‘conditions [that] sound governance-
related...are indeed central to the IMF’s economic policy concerns.’6  The ongoing review of 
the 1997 ‘Guidance Note on the Role of the Fund in Governance Issues’ also indicates top-
level commitment especially to the anti-corruption strategy (IMF 2017; cf. IMF 2016). The 
good governance agenda retains wide support at the Bank as well. When the organisation 
underwent a round of controversial restructuring in 2013-14, the Governance Global Practice 
emerged as one of its stronger arms, employing about 700 specialists. In fact, as testimony to 
the Bank’s ongoing commitment, the 2017 World Development Report was dedicated to 
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‘Governance and the Law’ (World Bank 2017). Note also that broad institutions remain a 
core theme amongst leading development economist (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
If shareholder and ideational preferences cannot explain the receding content of the 
PWC, what can? A two-step analysis centred on operational imperatives provides strong 
causal insight: First, constraints that culminated in the weak internalisation of some PWC 
components have persisted; original challenges of exploration and layering were never fully 
resolved.  Second, new internal and external imperatives have emerged to further undermine 
the viability of the onerous elements of the agenda, to finally catalyse their partial decline.   
Internally, despite continued shared belief amongst staff and management in the 
centrality of ‘broad institutions’ for organisational mandates, reservations concerning 
operational feasibility remain strong, and have been reinforced by a barrage of real-world 
evidence. As a Fund executive who served as a regional deputy director throughout the 2000s 
puts it, ‘we know we cannot make countries better unless we deal with deep causes, but then 
the list grows and grows — and that became a problem.’7
Recent changes in lending framework and instruments have also worked against the 
receding elements of the PWC. Chief amongst them on the Fund side was the discontinuation 
in 2009 of structural performance criteria (SPC), the most stringent form of ex post 
conditionality. Building on mounting internal attacks (IEO 2007), the move discouraged 
extensive reliance on structural conditions that had provided the core means to push through 
PWC-style reforms. At the same time, adoption of social spending targets in concessional 
lending (Clegg 2014) enabled the organisation to signal its commitment to social 
sustainability without becoming enmeshed in the intricacies of policy design through 
conditionality. The general direction of shift in recent years has been against top-down 
structural reform and towards according borrowers greater leeway in programme design, as 
exemplified most clearly in the replacement of PRSPs with an Economic Development 
Document (EDD), for which borrowers can nominate existing national development plans. 
Changes in the Bank’s lending architecture, though less dramatic, also fit this trend. In the 
same spirit as the EDD, for example, the Bank’s new Program-for Results (PforR) funds 
existing government programmes (Cormier 2016). And in a move that echoes an increasingly 
discretionary approach to the governance agenda, the latest review of the PforR called for 
easing the anti-corruption guidelines for the scheme, whose ‘current articulation...has made 
them a point of unnecessary contention for many borrowers’ (World Bank-OPCS 2015: vi). 
None of these revisions to lending framework explicitly aim to undermine the PWC, but they 
indicate an internal operational environment less amenable to its already contested elements.         
 A prime example of this internal 
discomfort is the 2008 report on long-term Fund engagement in Kenya, which reproached the 
organisation’s strategy for having been ‘dominated by governance concerns’ and for 
eventually becoming ‘bogged down’ amidst accusations of ‘mission creep through the 
extension of conditionality outside the Fund’s area of expertise’ (IMF 2008: 40–41). Given 
the short-term focus of most Fund facilities, the effectiveness of aiming to instigate structural 
change from outside has also been questioned: ‘Where corruption is embedded in the political 
economy...progress can be slow, even with extensive conditionality’ (IMF 2017: 46). At the 
Bank, too, internal assessment of institutional reform programmes signalled poor outcomes 
(IEG 2006) and identified bottlenecks in implementation (as later research extensively 
documented; Güven 2012b; O’Meally 2014). These operational hardships facing the ‘broad 
institutions’ agenda have prompted renewed emphasis on mainstreaming governance themes, 
as reflected in the creation of a donor-driven Governance Partnership Facility in 2008 and the 
2012 strategy update following persistent internal criticism (IEG 2011; World Bank 2012).  
These internal changes are often reflective of, and at times direct responses to, wide-
ranging external imperatives rooted in the transformations taking place in the international 
development regime (Babb and Chorev 2016; Harman and Williams 2014). The core 
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dynamic here is the accelerated rise of ‘emerging powers’, which challenges the extant 
architecture of international development by fostering new avenues of South-South 
cooperation, thereby offering new sources of development finance, and fuels a heightened 
sense of policy sovereignty, thereby engendering an increasingly critical attitude towards the 
twins’ policy intrusions in the South (Güven 2017b; Mawdsley 2017; Prizzon et al. 2017).  
 These trends not only reinforce pre-existing external constraints, but introduce new 
ones as well. That most borrowers, especially large MICs, displayed an aversion to top-down 
governance reforms has already been mentioned. As a WDR background paper notes, the 
governance agenda generated significant ‘pushback from developing countries’ (Lateef 2016: 
29). There is no indication this resistance to externally-imposed institutional reforms is 
subsiding. To the contrary, most governments are keen to use their enhanced options to 
exercise control over their exposure to the IFIs’ wide repertoire. Case in point is the evolving 
relationship between the Bank and its ‘emerging power’ borrowers, which exert ever 
increased autonomy to access funds in line with their strategic priorities (Güven 2017a). It is 
no surprise that politically controversial and administratively onerous broad institutional 
reforms do not receive much demand in this new context. But even in the supposedly well-
entrenched agenda of social sustainability, greater selectivity is at work. According to a 
senior human development specialist at a major country office, for instance, topics such as 
gender and education have been increasingly classified as ‘taboo’ by the member government 
for they are deemed culturally sensitive and require a long-term strategy. Bank funding to 
human development in this client has shifted to health and labour market policy, positive 
outcomes of which are readily demonstrable in the span of a typical electoral cycle.8
Even when countries are formally bound by PWC norms, implementation is varied 
and enforcement often problematic. The Fund’s imposition of governance-related 
conditionalities is known to noticeably vary across borrowers, which raises ‘questions about 
evenhandedness’ (IMF 2017: 46). The Bank also suffers from arbitrary implementation of its 
governance safeguards. For example, since the 2012 strategy update, all projects are required 
to submit a GAC analysis. In practice, however, how this condition is met depends on the 
‘understanding’ between the country directorship and the client government. As a governance 
specialist at a large country office reveals, it is not uncommon for the GAC analysis to be 
diluted significantly and ‘reduced to a tick-box exercise’.
 
9 This ‘structural context of power 
between the Bank and the country’ also determines the prominence of governance themes in 
a client’s portfolio. Whereas volume borrowers can afford to sidetrack the agenda, avoiding 
unpalatable exposure of their institutional weaknesses by a major IO, the Bank can push 
governance issues more freely in smaller clients.10
That the partial decline of the PWC was driven by operational imperatives (and not by 
ideational shifts or major shareholder interests) is important for understanding its wider 
implications. Do current patterns signify a ‘paradigm contraction’ and thus a potential return 
to Washington Consensus, or do they herald the forging of a new, different consensus? 
Neither. Although the Fund’s focus retreated towards areas of its core expertise, this ‘back to 
basics’ approach (Broome 2015) is hardly a simple reinstatement of orthodox neoliberalism 
given its reformed views on fiscal stimulus, capital controls, and social spending. At the 
Bank, meanwhile, the only lending direction clearly on the rise today is the infrastructure-
driven, capital-fundamentalist national developmentalism of the postwar decades, with the 
organisation countering Chinese threats to its business (the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank and the New Development Bank) via both collaborations with these new players and 
novel initiatives such as the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF). This renewed focus is bound 
 Empirical findings in Figure 10 are 
consistent with this observation, with ‘broad institutions’ themes receiving twice as much 
reference per project in Africa than elsewhere. Growing power asymmetries in the South 
reduces the consistent application of good governance criteria to a fantasy.   
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to divert resources further away from characteristic PWC themes and may also induce 
relaxation of environmental and governance safeguards, yet by itself it does not amount to the 
type of cohesive policy paradigm Washington Consensus represented (Babb 2013). 
What, then, should we make of the partial decline of the PWC? It is tempting to 
characterise the gap between the IFIs’ strong rhetorical commitment versus weak policy 
implementation regarding some PWC norms as another instance of ‘organised hypocrisy’ 
(Weaver 2008). Yet there is an important nuance: Neither ideationally dismissed nor fully 
abandoned on the ground, the PWC elements in decline are routinely practised with 
reasonable sincerity as part of the Fund and Bank’s wide repertoire. The difference with the 
heyday of the PWC is that their application is now increasingly discretionary, and dependent 
on borrower demand — especially in volume borrowers: Ukraine’s 2014-15 EFFs were rich 
in anti-corruption conditionality because Ukrainian officials demanded so (IMF 2017: 42); 
Brazil borrows heavily from the Bank towards governance reforms because the federal 
government uses DPLs to push disciplinary fiscal and administrative reforms in sub-national 
governments (World Bank 2011: 12). 
Seen this way, the partial decline of the PWC constitutes an important change not in 
policy paradigm but in policy practice. While unavoidably containing a degree of hypocrisy, 
the IFIs’ preference for diversity and discretion over uniformity and coercive diffusion makes 
more sense when understood in terms of ‘bureaucratic ambiguity’ (Best 2012a; 2012b). 
Encountering systemic shifts in their operational environment, the Fund and Bank are 
exchanging normative certitude about some arduous components of their repertoire for 
greater flexibility on the ground: whether or not governance matters is uncertain until they hit 
the ground in a client. While their earlier practice also employed ambiguity and uncertainty,11
 
 
the gains from discretion and selectivity this time around are of a different order. The policy 
content of the PWC agenda is so comprehensive that, when implemented ‘on demand’ and by 
paying careful attention to requisite competence, it tremendously expands the range of 
developmental ‘problems’ and country contexts towards which the Fund and Bank can 
feasibly make loans without being seen as selfish, paternalistic overseers. At a time when 
conventional patterns of North-South development cooperation are facing greater scrutiny, 
this steady steering of their policy practice away from dogged standardisation and towards 
flexible applications of their wide repertoire has good adaptive value for the twins. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The PWC marked a paradigm expansion that complemented the market-orientation of 
orthodox neoliberalism with a novel focus on the socio-political dimension of development. 
Yet the broad and arduous reform agenda it advanced proved inherently susceptible to severe 
internal and external operational constraints. Amidst shifts in lending framework and more 
crucially in the wider context of international development, these constraints have forced a 
selective, organisation- and borrower-specific disengagement from the PWC in Fund and 
Bank programmes over the past decade. Far from a paradigm shift, however, this partial 
retreat represents an adjustment in policy practice towards greater flexibility and discretion. 
These findings have implications for the scholarship on the Fund and Bank; they also 
highlight signs of change in the parameters of North-South development cooperation.  
Theoretically the main contribution of the paper is to recognise operational 
imperatives as important drivers of IFI practice. This vantage point offers an effective way of 
bridging the rationalist-constructivist divide in IO theory by invoking variables from both 
camps. In the context of the present analysis, it calls for sharpening our understanding of two 
specific phenomena. First, the article has drawn attention to shifts in the lending environment. 
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There is already emergent interest from both rationalist and constructivist scholars on the 
IFIs’ wider operational environment (Lipscy 2015; Moschella and Vetterlein 2014), but the 
focus must be extended methodically towards borrower diversity and preferences, which 
arguably constitutes the most significant external constraint facing the twins today. Yet while 
borrower influence is routinely mentioned (e.g. Woods 2006: 4; Park 2010; Güven 2017a), 
we need more empirical and theoretical work to help classify different mechanisms of such 
influence and explain precisely how borrowers shape lending practice.             
 Second, the analysis calls for more attention to discrepancy and ambiguity in IFI 
practice by offering clear evidence of pervasive reliance on these phenomena in recent Fund 
and Bank programmes. Constructivist research has already made crucial advances to that end 
(Best 2012a; 2012b; Weaver 2008), but the focus must be broadened to a wider range of 
everyday practice. Doing so, however, requires abandoning rigid assumptions of consistency 
in IFI behaviour that often characterizes research on ‘policy change’ and continuity (cf. 
Moschella and Vetterlein 2014). Analysis must be open to instances of unintended, partial 
and inconsistent forms of change, examples of which have been provided in abundance in 
this paper (e.g. contrasting fortunes of broad versus narrow institutions in different types of 
borrowers, or seemingly innocuous adjustments in lending framework instigating substantive 
changes in the strength of commitment across different policy domains). 
 Finally, while tracing the trajectory of the PWC, this analysis has contributed to the 
scholarship on the contemporary shifts taking place in international development (Babb and 
Chorev 2016; Harman and Williams 2014; Mawdsley 2017). These shifts clearly undermine 
the ideational appeal of and constrain the operational space for grand development paradigms 
of the kind the PWC has epitomised — a panoply of policy and institutional norms concocted 
in the North and dispensed from above across vastly different country contexts by Northern 
organisations via conditional lending. Any genuinely feasible North-South development 
cooperation today would require firmly abandoning such antiquated modes of coercive 
diffusion. Given their discreet quest for flexibility as evidenced in this research, the Fund and 
Bank appear to implicitly understand this constraint. Whether quiet adaptations of this sort 
will suffice to preserve the twins’ viability in the global system will depend not only on how 
such initiatives will be received by their conventional borrowers, but also on the expansion 
strategies of emergent South-led institutions of development cooperation. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 SDR (special drawing rights) is IMF currency; at the time of writing (Aug 2017) 1 SDR equals 1.41 US$. IMF 
financial year (FY) runs from 1 May to 30 April (e.g. FY2017 runs from 1 May 2016 to 30 April 2017).   
2 MONA is available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/mona/index.aspx.  
3 Interview with World Bank Country Director, 25 July 2012.  
4 Currently there are more than 10,000 IBRD-IDA projects listed in the World Bank’s project database. See 
http://projects.worldbank.org/advancedsearch?lang=en (accessed 31 August 2017).  
5 Note the difference in the types of data presented in Figures 5 through 8 versus in Figures 9 and 10. The 
former compare the volume of commitments to major themes in relation to total volume of Bank commitments 
in each region to determine relative trends, whereas the latter indicate the frequency with which individual 
themes appear in Bank projects.   
6 Interview with former IMF mission head, 12 May 2016. 
7 Interview with former IMF regional deputy director, 9 August 2016; emphasis added.  
8 Interview with World Bank senior human development specialist at country office, 3 December 2015. 
9 Interview with World Bank governance specialist at country office, 9 June 2016. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Best (2012a; 2012b) considers ambiguity a key mechanism in the development of Bank’s good governance 
agenda and in the long-term evolution of the Fund’s conditionality practice. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Selected Categories of PWC-Related IMF Structural Conditionalities  
Based on MONA Economic Codes/Economic Descriptors  
 
Fiscal and 
Monetary 
Restructuring 
7.1  Revenues 
7.2  Expenditures 
7.3  Treasury system 
10.2  Central Bank reform 
20.1 / 1.1  Revenue measures, excluding trade policy 
20.2 / 1.2  Revenue administration, including customs 
20.6 / 1.6  Expenditure auditing, accounting and financial controls 
20.7 / 1.7  Fiscal transparency (publication, parliamentary oversight) 
21.1 / 2.1  Central bank operations and reforms 
21.2  / 2.2  Central bank auditing transparency and financial controls 
Financial 
Policy and 
Reform 
10.1  Bank regulation and supervision 
10.3  Financial legal reforms 
25.1 / 6.1  Financial sector legal reforms, regulation and supervision 
Public and 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
 
7.6  Civil service reform 
7.7  Inter-governmental relations 
7.8  Governance 
14.1  Corporate restructuring 
14.2  Legal and regulatory framework 
14.3  Transparency 
20.9 / 1.9  Inter-governmental relations 
30.1 / 11.1  Private sector legal and regulatory environment reform 
(non-financial sector) 
30.4 / 11.4  Anti-corruption legislation/policy 
Social Policy 
 
 
8.1  Pension reform 
8.2  Health sector 
8.3  Education sector 
8.4  Social welfare 
9  Social safety net 
12  Labor market 
14.4  PRSP development & implementation 
23.1 / 4.1  Pension reforms 
23.2 / 4.2  Other social sector reforms (e.g. social safety nets, health and 
education) 
28 / 9  Labor markets, excluding public sector employment 
30.3 / 11.3  PRSP development and implementation 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Selected ‘Narrow Institutions’ vs ‘Broad Institutions’ Themes in IBRD-IDA Projects 
(Figures 9 and 10) 
 
‘Narrow institutions’ themes 
Corporate governance 
Environmental policies and institutions 
International financial architecture 
International financial standards and systems 
Municipal governance and institutions building 
Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 
Regulation and competition policy 
Rural policies and institutions 
Tax policy and administration 
 
‘Broad institutions’ themes 
Access to law and justice 
Administrative and civil service reform 
Decentralization 
Judicial and other dispute resolution mechanisms 
Law reform 
Legal institutions for a market economy 
Legal services 
Other accountability/anti-corruption 
Other public sector governance 
Other rule of law 
Personal and property rights 
 
 
 
